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Abstract—In this work, we consider the economics of the
interaction between Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs)
and Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). We investigate the
incentives of an MNO for offering some of her resources to an
MVNO instead of using the resources for her own. We formulate
the problem as a sequential game. We consider a market with
one MNO and one MVNO, and a continuum of undecided end-
users. We assume that EUs have different preferences for the
MNO and the MVNO. These preferences can be because of the
differences in the service they are offering or the reluctance of
an EU to buy her plan from one of them. We assume that the
preferences also depend on the investment level the MNO and the
MVNO. We show that there exists a unique interior SPNE, i.e.
the SPNE by which both SPs receive a positive mass of EUs, and
characterize it. We also consider a benchmark case in which the
MNO and the MVNO do not cooperate, characterize the unique
SPNE of this case, and compare the results of our model to the
benchmark case to assess the incentive of the MNO to invest in
her infrastructure and to offer it to the MVNO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, wireless services have been offered by Service
Providers (SPs) that own the infrastructure they are operating
on. Nowadays SPs are divided into (i) Mobile Network Op-
erators (MNOs) that own the infrastructure, and (ii) Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) that do not own the
infrastructure they are operating on, and use the resources of
one or more MNOs based on a business contract. MVNOs can
distinguish their plans from MNOs by bundling their service
with other products, offering different pricing plans for End-
Users (EUs), or building a good reputation through a better
customer service. In recent years, the number of MVNOs is
rapidly growing. According to [1], between June 2010 and
June 2015, the number of MVNOs increased by 70 percent
worldwide, reaching 1,017 as of June 2015. Even some MNOs
developed their own MVNOs. An example of which is Cricket
wireless which is owned by At&t and offers a prepaid wireless
service to EUs.
In this work, we consider the economics of the interaction
between MVNOs and MNOs. We investigate the incentives
of an MNO for offering some of her resources to an MVNO
instead of using the resources for her own. Thus, we consider
competition and cooperation between an MNO and an MVNO.
Note that it is not apriori known how much an MNO is willing
to invest on the infrastructure and how much an MVNO
is willing to lease. More importantly, it is not apriori clear
that under what conditions the MNO prefers to generate her
revenue through the MVNO by leasing the resources to her,
and therefore letting the MVNO to attract EUs.
Many works have considered the economics of re-
source/spectrum sharing and the subsequent profit sharing
between SPs. Examples are [2]–[9]. In these works, authors
model the environment using game theory and seek to provide
intuitions for the pricing schemes, the split of EUs/benefits
between SPs, and the investment level of different SPs. In
this work, however, as mentioned before, we focus on the
competition between the MNOs and MVNOs.
We consider a market with one MNO (e.g. At&t) and one
MVNO (e.g. Google’s Project Fi). We assume that the MVNO
is active, i.e. has already some resources, and is willing to lease
additional resources from the MNO in exchange of a fee. The
MNO decides on the investment level. Subsequently, knowing
this decision, the MVNO decides on the number of resources
she wants to lease from the MNO. Then, simultaneously, both
MNO and MNVO decide on their pricing strategies for EUs.
Finally, EUs choose one of the MNO or MVNO to buy the
wireless plan from. We assume the per resource fee that the
MVNO pays to the MNO to be fixed and discuss about the
framework for determining this fee.
To model EUs, we consider a continuum of undecided EUs
that decide which of the SPs they want to buy their wireless
plan from. We assume that EUs have different preferences
for each SP. These preferences can be because of different
services that SPs offer. For example, the MVNO can bundle
the wireless service with a free or cheap international call
plan (through VoIP) to make her service more favorable for
some EUs. Moreover, the preferences can be because of the
reluctance of an EU to buy her wireless plan from a particular
SP (e.g. an SP with an infamous customer service). We assume
that the preferences also depend on the investment level of the
SPs. In other words, the higher the investment level of an SP,
the lower would be the reluctance of an EU for that SP.
Different preferences of EUs for SPs enables the possibility
of different outcomes for the market. For example, the MVNO
who bundles her service with free international call may attract
some of EUs even with a higher price than what MNO is
offering. Thus, instead of competing for EUs (by lowering
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her price), the MNO can lease some of her resources to this
MVNO and receives her share of profit through the MVNO.
We formulate the game as a sequential game, and seek the
Sub-game Perfect Nash Eequilibrium (SPNE) of the sequential
game using backward induction. We show that there exists a
unique interior SPNE, i.e. the SPNE by which both SPs receive
a positive mass of EUs, and characterize it. Moreover, we
consider a benchmark case in which the MNO does not invest
in her infrastructure, and subsequently the MVNO cannot lease
any resources from the MNO. We characterize the unique
SPNE of this case. We compare the results of our model to the
benchmark case to assess the incentive of the MNO to invest
in her infrastructure and to offer it to the MVNO.
Analytic and numerical results reveal that although the
number of EUs and the price that the MNO quotes for EUs
might be lower than those of the MVNO, the MNO would still
generate a higher payoff than the MVNO if the per resource
fee that the MVNO pays to the MNO is sufficiently higher
than the marginal cost of investment on the infrastructure.
In addition, results reveal that if the MNO knows that EUs
are reluctant joining her or have a high preference for the
MVNO, then a better strategy for her would be to invest in
her infrastructure, lease a portion (or the whole) of the new
resources to the MVNO, and collect the benefit through the
fees she charges for the resources leased to the MVNO.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the model. In Section III, we find the SPNE
strategies. We present the SPNE outcome in Section IV. In
Section V, we prove the results of the benchmark case. Finally,
in Section VI, we present the numerical results and discuss
about the results.
II. MODEL
We consider one MNO and one MVNO that compete in
attracting a pool of undecided EUs. We assume that the
MVNO is active, i.e. has already some resources. Thus, the
model is set up such that even when the MVNO does not lease
any resources from the MNO, it can still attract some of EUs.
SPs:
We denote the MNO by SPL (L represents Leader, since this
SP is the leader of the game), and denote the MVNO by SPF
(F represents Follower, since this SP is the follower of this
leader/follower game). SPL owns the infrastructure, invests in
her infrastructure to attract EUs, and can lease parts of the
new resources to SPF in exchange of money.
We denote the fee per resources that SPF pays to SPL by s.
The utility of SPF is increasing with the revenue from EUs,
which depends on the number of EUs (nF ) and the access fee
(pF ). This utility is decreasing with respect to the fee she pays
to SPL to reserve resources, i.e. sI2F , where IF is the number
of resources that SPF reserves from SPL:
piF = nF (pF − c)− sI2F (1)
, where c is the marginal cost associated with each user. Note
that naturally, we expect the cost of investing in infrastructure
to be convex, i.e. the cost of investment per resources increases
with the amount of resources. For simplicity in analysis, we
consider the cost of reserving resources to be quadratic with
respect to IF .1
The utility of SPL is:
piL = nL(pL − c) + sI2F − γI2L (2)
where nL, pL, and IL are the number of EUs with SPL,
the access fee quoted by SPL for EUs, and the number of
resources that SPL add to her infrastructure. Note that γ is
the marginal cost of investment. Thus, the utility of SPL is
increasing with the revenue from EUs (nL(pL − c)) and the
fee received from SPF (sI2F ), and is decreasing with respect
to the investment cost (γI2L). Note that we consider the cost
of investment to be a quadratic function of IL.2
Trivially, we assume that the fee per resources (s) is greater
than or equal to the marginal cost of investment on the
infrastructure (γ), i.e. s ≥ γ. Also, note that IF ≤ IL. To have
a non-trivial problem, we also assume IL > 0 and IF ≥ 0.
The strategies of SPL is to choose the access fee for EUs
(pL) and the level of investment (IL). The strategies of SPF
is to choose the access fee for EUs (pF ) and the number of
resources she leases from SPL (IF ). We assume that the per
resource fee s is pre determined, possibly through a bargaining
framework between SPL and SPF .
EUs:
The strategy of an EU is to choose one of the SPs to buy
wireless plan from. We model the EUs using a hotelling model.
We assume that the SPL is located at 0, SPF is located at 1,
and EUs are distributed uniformly along the unit interval [0, 1].
The closer an EU to an SP, the more this EU prefers this SP
to the other. Note that the notion of closeness and distance
is used to model the preference of EUs, and may not be the
same as physical distance.
Specifically, the EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs a transport
cost of tLx (respectively, tF (1 − x)) when joining SPL
(respectively, SPF ), where tL (respectively, tF ) is the marginal
transport cost for SPL (respectively, SPF ). In sum, we consider
tL and tF as the reluctance of EUs for connecting to SPL and
SPF , respectively.
We assume the transport costs of EUs to depend on the
investment level of SPs. Thus, we assume that the higher the
investment level of an SP in comparison to the other SP, the
higher would be the reluctance of EUs for joining the other
SP. This model is used to captures the factor of quality in the
decision of EUs. Thus, the transport cost of SPL and SPF
are considered to be tL = IFIL and tF = 1 − tL = IL−IFIL ,
respectively.
Therefore, the utility of an EU located at distance xj of
SPj , j ∈ {L,F} is:
uxj = v
∗ − tjxj − pj (3)
1The overall intuitions of the model are expected to be the same in the case
of considering any convex function of IF
2Intuitions of the model are expected to be the same when considering any
convex function of IL.
, where v∗ is a common valuation that captures the value of
buying a wireless plan for EUs regardless of the SP chosen.
Formulation:
We model the interaction between SPs and EUs using a four-
stage sequential game. Naturally, we assume that SPL makes
the first move and is the leader of the game. The timing and
the stages of the game are as follows:
1) SPL decides on the investment on the infrastructure (IL).
2) SPF decides on the investment, i.e. number of resources
to lease from SPL (IF such that IF ≤ IL).
3) SPL and SPF determine the access fees for EUs (re-
spectively, pL and pF ).
4) EUs decide to subscribe to one of the SPs.
We assumed the selection of investments by SPs (IL and
IF ) to happen before the selection of prices for EUs (pL and
pF ) since investment decisions are long-term decision. These
decisions are expected to be kept constant over longer time
horizons in comparison to pricing decisions.
In the sequential game framework, we seek a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium using backward induction:
Definition 1. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE):
A strategy is an SPNE if and only if it constitutes a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game.
Definition 2. Backward Induction: Characterizing the equi-
librium strategies starting from the last stage of the game and
proceeding backward.
We also assume the full market coverage of EUs by SPs.
This means that each EU chooses exactly one SP to subscribe
to. This assumption is common in hotelling models and is
necessary to ensure competition between SPs. An equivalent
assumption is to consider the common valuation v∗ to be
sufficiently large so that the utility of EUs for buying a wireless
plan is positive regardless of the choice of SP.
One might think that SPL can eliminate competition by not
offering her resources to SPF (or simply not investing in new
infrastructure), and use the full market coverage to act as a
monopoly. However, this is not the case in our model. Recall
that we assumed the SPF to have resources independent of
SPL. Thus, regardless of the strategy of SPL, SPF would be
still active in the market, and the full market coverage would
not lead to the monopoly of SPL.
III. THE SUB-GAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the backward induction, we start with Stage 4:
Stage 4:
In this subsection, we characterize the division of EUs
between SPs in the equilibrium, i.e. nL and nF , using the
knowledge of the strategies chosen by the SPs in Stages 1,
2, and 3. To do so, we characterize the location of the EU
that is indifferent between joining either of the SPs, xn. Thus,
EUs located at [0, xn) join SPL, and those located at (xn, 1]
joins the non-neutral SPF (using the full market coverage
assumption).
The EU located at xn ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between
connecting to SPL ans SPF if:
v∗ − tF (1− xn)− pF = v∗ − tLxn − pL
⇒ xn = tF + pF − pL
tL + tF
(4)
Note that tF + tL = 1. Substituting the value of tF yields:
xn =
IL − IF
IL
+ pF − pL (5)
Thus, the fraction of EUs with each SP (nL and nF ) is:
nL =

0 if xn < 0
IL−IF
IL
+ pF − pL if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1
1 if xn > 1
nF = 1− nL
(6)
Stage 3:
In this stage, SPL and SPF determine their prices for
EUs, pL and pF , respectively, to maximize their payoff.
We seek for Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies. Note that in
general there might exist several NE strategies: some of them
corner equilibria (an extreme case in which one of the SPs
receives zero EUs) and some interior equilibria (in which
both SPs receive a positive mass of EUs). In practice, the
latter equilibria are expected to occur more frequently. Thus,
henceforth, we seek to characterize the interior equilibria, i.e.
when 0 < nL < 1 and 0 < nF < 1.
Thus, we look for all NE by which 0 < xn < 1 (xn
characterized in the previous stage of the game). In this case,
using (1), (2), and (6), the payoffs of SPs would be:
piF = (
IF
IL
+ pL − pF )(pF − c)− sI2F (7)
piL = (
IL − IF
IL
+ pF − pL)(pL − c) + sI2F − γI2L (8)
2 In the following theorem, we prove that the NE uniquely
exists and characterize it:
Theorem 1. The NE strategies of Stage 3 by which 0 < nL <
1 and 0 < nF < 1 are unique, and are pF = c+ IL+IF3IL and
pL = c+
2IL−IF
3IL
.
Remark 1. Note that dpLdIL ≥ 0 and
dpF
dIL
≤ 0. Thus, as we
expect intuitively, pL (respectively, pF ) is increasing (respec-
tively, decreasing) with respect to IL. Also, pL (respectively,
pF ) is decreasing (respectively, increasing) with respect to IF .
Proof. In this case, every NE should satisfy the first order
condition. Thus, p∗F and p
∗
L should be determined such that
dpiF
dpF
= 0 and dpiLdpL = 0. The first order conditions yield:
2p∗F − p∗L = IF
IL
+ c & 2p∗L − p∗F = IL − IF
IL
+ c
Thus,
p∗F = c+
IL + IF
3IL
& p∗L = c+
2IL − IF
3IL
(9)
Therefore, p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique NE strategies if they yield
0 < xn < 1 and no unilateral deviation is profitable for SPs.
In Case A, we check the former, and in Case B, we check the
latter.
Case A: We first check the condition that with p∗L and p∗F ,
0 < xn < 1. Using (5) and (9):
xn =
IL − IF
IL
+ p∗F − p∗L =
2IL − IF
3IL
, which is greater than zero since IL ≥ IF and IL > 0. xn
is also clearly less than one (note that IF ≥ 0). Thus, the
condition 0 < xn < 1 holds.
Case B: Note that d
2piF
dp2F
< 0 and d
2piL
dp2L
< 0. Thus, any
solutions to the first order conditions would maximize the
payoff of the SPs when 0 < xn < 1, and no unilateral
deviation by which 0 < xn < 1 would be profitable for SPs.
Now, we discuss that any deviation by SPs such that nL = 0
and nL = 1 (which subsequently yields nF = 1 and nF = 0,
respectively) is not profitable. Note that the payoff of SPs,
(1) and (2), are continuous as nL ↓ 0, and nL ↑ 1 (which
subsequently yields nF ↑ 1 and nF ↓ 0, respectively). Thus,
the payoffs of both SPs when selecting p∗L and p
∗
F (solutions of
first order conditions) are greater than or equal to the payoffs
when nL = 0 and nL = 1. Thus, any deviation by SPs such
that nL = 0 or nL = 1 is not profitable for SPs.
This complete the proof that p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique NE
strategies by which both SPs are active, i.e. 0 < xn < 1.
Stage 2:
In this stage of the game, SPF decides on the investment
level, i.e. the number of resources to be leased from SPL (IF ),
with the condition that IF ≤ IL to maximize piF :
max
IF≤IL
piF = max
IF≤IL
(IL + IF
3IL
)2 − sI2F (10)
Note that for the last equality, we used (7) and Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. The optimum investment level of SPF is:
I∗F =

IL
9sI2L−1
if IL >
√
2
9s
IL if IL ≤
√
2
9s
(11)
Remark 2. If the fee per resources (s) or the investment by
SPL (IL) is low, then SPF reserves all the available resources.
If not, then SPF reserves a fraction of available resources
(I∗F < IL). Note that in this case,
dI∗F
dIL
< 0. Thus, the higher
the number of available resources, the lower would be the
number of resources reserved by SPF .
Proof. Note that in (10), piF is concave over IF if s > 19I2L
,
piF is convex if s < 19I2L
, and is linear if s = 1
9I2L
. We
characterize the optimum investment level, i.e. I∗F under each
of these conditions:
s > 1
9I2L
:
In this case, the payoff of SPF is concave. Thus, the first
order condition yields the possible optimum investment level,
IˆF :
dpiF
dIF
|IˆF = 0⇒
2(IˆF + IL)
9I2L
− 2sIˆF = 0
⇒ IˆF = IL
9sI2L − 1
(12)
Thus, the optimum investment level, I∗F is:
I∗F = min{IˆF , IL} (13)
Note that from the assumption of this case 9sI2L > 1. Thus,
IˆF > 0 (using (12)). In addition, from the expression of IˆF
(12):
IˆF < IL ⇐⇒ 9sI2L > 2
Thus, the optimum investment level for SPF would be:
I∗F =

IL
9sI2
L
−1 if IL >
√
2
9s
IL if IL ≤
√
2
9s
(14)
s < 1
9I2L
:
In this case, piF would be convex. Thus, the optimum level
of investment would be on the boundaries of the feasible set.
Thus, I∗F would be either 0 or IL, whichever yields a higher
payoff. Note that:
piF |IF=0 =
1
9
& piF |IF=IL =
4
9
− sI2L
Thus, I∗F = IL if and only if
4
9 − sI2L ≥ 19 (Note that we
assumed that if IF = 0 and IF = IL yield the same payoff,
then SPF chooses IF = IL). Thus, s ≤ 13I2L yields I
∗
F = IL.
Note that from the assumption of the case, s < 1
9I2L
< 1
3I2L
.
Thus, I∗F = IL.
s = 1
9I2L
:
In this case, piF would be an increasing linear function of
IF . Thus, I∗F = IL.
Putting all the cases together, the result of the theorem
follows.
Stage 1:
In this stage, SPL decides on the level of investment IL to
maximize her payoff, piL:
max
IL
piL = max
IL
(
2IL − I∗F
3IL
)2 + sI∗2F − γI2L (15)
where for the last equality, we used (8) and Theorem 1, and I∗F
is characterized in (11). In the next theorem, we characterize
the candidate optimum answers:
Theorem 3. The optimum solution to (15) is I∗L =
min{
√
2
9s , IˆL}, where IˆL is the solution of the first order
condition on:
piL,I∗F =
1
9
(2− 1
9sI2L − 1
)2 + s
IL
9sI2L − 1
− γI2L (16)
Remark 3. Theorem yields that the minimum optimum level
of investment by SPL is
√
2
9s .
Remark 4. Note that the first term in (16) is increasing with
IL (since the number of EUs is increasing with IL). The
second term is the payment from SPF which is decreasing with
respect to IL (since when IL >
√
2
9s , I
∗
F is decreasing with
respect to IL). The third term is the cost of investment which
is decreasing with IL. Thus, when either s or γ is sufficiently
large, we expect the utility (16) to be decreasing with respect
to IL, and the optimum answer to be I∗L =
√
2
9s . On the
other hand, IˆL is expected to be the optimum answer when
both s and γ are sufficiently small. We discuss about this in
Numerical Results (Section VI). Numerical results reveal that
for large sets of parameters, we expect I∗F =
√
2
9s .
Proof. To find the optimum level of investment, I∗L, consider
two scenarios:
IL ≤
√
2
9s :
In this case, I∗F = IL by (11). Thus, the maximization (15)
would become:
max
IL≤
√
2
9s
(s− γ)I2L
Thus:
I∗L =
{ √
2
9s if s ≥ γ
0 if s < γ
(17)
Note that we assumed that if IL > 0 and IL = 0 yield the
same payoff for SPL, then this SP chooses IL > 0. This is
the reason that for s = γ, IL > 0 is chosen. Also, recall that
to have a non-trivial problem, we assumed s ≥ γ. Thus, if
IL ≤
√
2
9s , then I
∗
L =
√
2
9s .
IL >
√
2
9s :
In this case, I∗F =
IL
9sI2L−1
. Thus, the maximization (15)
would become:
max
IL>
√
2
9s
piL,I∗
F
=
1
9
(2− 1
9sI2L − 1
)2 + s
IL
9sI2L − 1
− γI2L (18)
Note that I∗F (11) is continuous at IL =
√
2
9s . Thus, as
IL →
√
2
9s , piL,I∗F → piL|IL=√ 29s , which is considered in
the previous case. Thus, the only possible optimum answer is
the solution to the first order condition on piL,I∗F , i.e. IˆL if
IˆL >
√
2
9s . Results of the theorem follows.
IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE GAME
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium outcome
of the game using the results of the previous section and
discuss about them. In Corollaries 1 and 2, we characterize
the equilibrium outcome when I∗L >
√
2
9s and I
∗
L ≤
√
2
9s ,
respectively. Note that in each case, there exists a unique
outcome and the two cases are mutually exclusive. Thus, the
outcome of the game exists and is unique.
A. If I∗L >
√
2
9s :
Corollary 1 (Outcome A). If I∗L >
√
2
9s , then:
• Stage 1: The optimum level of investment of SPL is I∗L =
IˆL (characterized in Theorem 3).
• Stage 2: The optimum level of investment by SPF is:
I∗F =
I∗L
9sI∗2L −1
.
• Stage 3: Prices for EUs are: p∗F = c +
1+ 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 and
p∗L = c+
2− 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 .
• Stage 4: The fractions of EUs with each SP are: n∗F =
1+ 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 and n
∗
L =
2− 1
9sI2
L
−1
3 .
Proof. The outcome of Stage 2 directly follows from the
results of Stage 2. The outcome of Stage 3 follows from (9)
and the outcome of Stage 2. The outcome of Stage 4 follows
from (6) and the outcomes of Stage 2 and 3.
Note that in this case, as discussed, I∗F is decreasing with re-
spect to I∗L and s. In addition, given that IL is fixed, p
∗
F and p
∗
L
are decreasing and increasing with respect to the per resource
fee, s, respectively. Also, given that s is fixed, p∗F and p
∗
L
are decreasing and increasing with I∗L, respectively. Regard-
less of p∗F (respectively, p
∗
L) being decreasing (respectively,
increasing), the number of EUs with SPF (respectively, SPL),
i.e. n∗F (respectively, n
∗
L) is still decreasing (respectively,
increasing) with respect to I∗L (if s fixed). This is because
of the increase (respectively, decrease) in tF (respectively,
tL), i.e. the transport cost of SPF (respectively, SPL). To
understand these changes in the transport costs, recall that
increasing I∗L, decreases I
∗
F , and subsequently increases tF .
In Section VI, we observe that I∗L is dependent on s.
Thus, the relationship between s and the outcome is more
complicated.
B. If I∗L ≤
√
2
9s :
Corollary 2 (Outcome B). If I∗L ≤
√
2
9s , then:
• Stage 1: I∗L =
√
2
9s .
• Stage 2: I∗F = I∗L.
• Stage 3: p∗F = c+
2
3 and p
∗
L = c+
1
3 .
• Stage 4: n∗F =
2
3 and n
∗
L =
1
3 .
Proof is similar to the proof of the previous corollary.
In this case, SPF reserves all available resources, and the
investment level of SPL (which is equal to the number of
resources reserved by SPF ) is a decreasing function of the fee
per resources, i.e. s. SPF quotes a higher price for EUs in
comparison to SPL. In spite of the higher price, SPF would
be able to attract more EUs given the better investment level
in comparison to SPL which translates into a lower transport
cost.
We calculate piL and piF using Corollary 2 and (2):
pi∗L =
1
3
− 2γ
9s
& pi∗F =
2
9
(19)
Thus, the payoff of SPL would be higher than the payoff of
SPF , i.e. pi∗L > pi
∗
F , if and only if s > 2γ. In this case, although
in comparison to SPF , SPL offers her service to EUs with
lower price and attracts a lower number of EUs, she can still
obtain a higher payoff through the per resource fee that she
collects from SPF . Thus, SPL leases the resources to SPF and
instead generates revenue through the fee she charges to SPF .
V. BENCHMARK CASE
Now, we consider the case in which SPL does not invest
in her infrastructure. Similar to the original model, both SPL
and SPF compete to attract a pool of undecided users. The
hotelling model for EUs is the same as before. The only
difference is the transport cost. Here, we consider the transport
costs to be parameters, and denote them by tL > 0 and tF > 0
for SPL and SPF , respectively. We discuss about the effects
of these parameters in the Numerical Results (Section VI).
The analysis of stage 4 of the game would be the same as
before, and by (4):
xn =
tF + pF − pL
tL + tF
(20)
Thus,
nL =

0 if xn < 0
tF+pF−pL
tL+tF
if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1
1 if xn > 1
nF = 1− nL
(21)
Note that in the benchmark case, there is no investment
decision. Thus, the payoffs of SPs would be modified as:
piF = nF (pF − c) (22)
piL = nL(pL − c) (23)
Thus, the only decision of SPs is to determine their pricing
for EUs. We use the same approach as Stage 3 of the game
to characterize the NE pricing strategies for SPs by which
0 < xn < 1:
Theorem 4. The NE pricing strategies of SPs are:
p∗F = c+
2tL + tF
3
p∗L = c+
tL + 2tF
3
Proof. Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3. p∗F and p
∗
L
should be determined such that dpiFdpF = 0 and
dpiL
dpL
= 0:
p∗F = c+
2tL + tF
3
& p∗L = c+
2tF + tL
3
(24)
Therefore, p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique NE strategies if they
yield 0 < xn < 1 and no unilateral deviation is profitable for
SPs. In Case A, we check the former, and in Case B, we check
the latter.
Case A: We first check the condition that with p∗L and p∗F ,
0 < xn < 1. Using (20) and (24):
xn =
2tF + tL
3(tF + tL)
, which is greater than zero since tF > 0 and tL > 0. xn is
also clearly less than one. Thus, the condition 0 < xn < 1
holds.
Case B: Note that d
2piF
dp2F
< 0 and d
2piL
dp2L
< 0. Thus, any
solutions to the first order conditions would maximize the
payoff of the SPs when 0 < xn < 1, and no unilateral
deviation by which 0 < xn < 1 would be profitable for SPs.
Now, we discuss that any deviation by SPs such that nL = 0
and nL = 1 (which subsequently yields nF = 1 and nF = 0,
respectively) is not profitable. Note that the payoff of SPs,
(22) and (23), are continuous as nL ↓ 0, and nL ↑ 1 (which
subsequently yields nF ↑ 1 and nF ↓ 0, respectively). Thus,
the payoffs of both SPs when selecting p∗L and p
∗
F (solutions of
first order conditions) are greater than or equal to the payoffs
when nL = 0 and nL = 1. Thus, any deviation by SPs such
that nL = 0 or nL = 1 is not profitable for SPs.
This complete the proof that p∗F and p
∗
L are the unique NE
strategies by which both SPs are active, i.e. 0 < xn < 1.
Note that in the absence of investments, Stage 2 and 1
would be of no importance. In the following corollary, we
characterize the outcome of the game in the benchmark case
(subscript B stands for Benchmark):
Corollary 3. The equilibrium outcome of the benchmark case
is as follows:
• NE pricing strategies are: p∗F,B = c+
2tL+tF
3 and p
∗
L,B =
c+ tL+2tF3 .
• Fractions of EUs with each SP: n∗L,B =
2tF+tL
3(tF+tL)
and
n∗F,B =
tF+2tL
3(tF+tL)
.
Using (22) and (23), the payoffs of SPs in these cases are:
pi∗F,B = (
tF + 2tL
3(tF + tL)
)2 & pi∗L,B = (
2tF + tL
3(tF + tL)
)2
(25)
Note that if tL > tF , then p∗F,B > p
∗
L,B , n
∗
F,B > n
∗
L,B , and
subsequently pi∗F,B > pi
∗
L,B , and vice versa. Thus, the SP that
EUs have lower reluctance for, receives the highest payoff.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we use numerical simulations (i) to de-
termine whether and under what conditions the outcome in
Corollary 1 (Outcome A) would emerge, and (ii) to provide
insights for results under different parameters of the model.
For all results, we consider c = 1.3
In Figure 1, we plot the optimum level of investment of
SPL (I∗L), the number of resources that SPF reserves (I
∗
F ),
and the minimum optimum level of investment by SPL (
√
2
9s ),
when γ = 0.1 (left) and γ = 0 (right) (recall that, in (2), γ
is the marginal cost of investment.). The discontinuities are
because of the transition of the outcome of the game from the
Outcome A to Outcome B (outcome in Corollary 2). Results
reveal that for each outcome, I∗L and I
∗
F are decreasing with
the per resource fee, s. Thus, the higher the fee per resources
3Note that the choice of c barely affects the results. It may only shift some
of the results (e.g. the price charged to EUs) by only a constant.
Fig. 1: Investment decisions of SPs vs. per resource fee, s
that SPF pays to SPL, the lower would be the number of
resources that SPF reserves, and subsequently the lower would
be the investment of SPL. Also, when the marginal cost of
investment (γ) is zero, SPL investment is significantly more
in comparison to γ = 0.1. Thus, intuitively, the higher the
investment cost, the lower would be the investment.
Results also confirm the intuitions presented in Remark 4
that for sufficiently small s and γ, the optimum level of invest-
ment by SPL would be equal to IˆL (introduced in Theorem 3)
which is higher than
√
2
9s (Outcome A). Numerical results
also reveal that for γ > 0.12, Outcome A would not occur even
for small s. Thus, the outcome in which IˆL is the optimum
level of investment only occurs for a small set of parameters.
Therefore, for a wide range of parameters, we expect Outcome
B to be the outcome of the game.
In Figure 2, we plot the pricing decisions of SPs for EUs,
i.e. p∗L and p
∗
F , for γ = 0.1 (left) and γ = 0 (right). Similar to
Figure 1, the discontinuities in the figures are because of the
transition of the outcome of the game from Outcome A to B.
Note that in Outcome B (when s is sufficiently large), p∗F and
p∗L are constant (given that c is a constant) independent of γ
and s, and the price that SPF charges is twice the price that
SPL charges. However, in Region A, if γ, i.e. the marginal
cost of investment, is extremely small (e.g. zero), then SPL
would be able to charge a higher price than SPF (Figure 2-
right). The reason is that for γ small, SPL will invest more
(I∗L small). We also stated in Section IV after Corollary 1 that
p∗F and p
∗
L are decreasing and increasing with I
∗
L, respectively.
Thus, small investment cost yields a higher investment by SPL
and as a result a higher price for EUs of this SP.
Also note that in Outcome A, depending on γ, prices can
be increasing or decreasing with s: If the marginal cost of
investment is extremely small, then p∗F is increasing with s
and p∗L is decreasing with s (Figure 2-right). The opposite is
true when γ is not small (Figure 2-left). To describe the reason
behind this result, note that from Corollary 1, p∗L and p
∗
F are
increasing and decreasing, respectively, with respect to both
s and I∗L. On the other hand, I
∗
L is itself decreasing with s
(Figure 1). Thus, as s increases two factors one increasing (s)
and one decreasing (I∗L) affect the prices. Numerical results
Fig. 2: Pricing decisions of SPs for EUs versus s
Fig. 3: Payoffs of SPs for EUs versus s
yield that when γ is extremely small (thus, I∗L is large), the
rate of change in I∗L with s dominates the rate of change in
s. Thus, as s increases, p∗F increases and p
∗
L decreases.
Note that by Corollaries 1 and 2, the dependency of n∗L and
n∗F to parameters of the model is similar to the dependency
of p∗L and p
∗
F . The only difference is the exclusion of c from
the expressions.
In Figure 3, we plot the payoffs of SPs, i.e. pi∗F and pi
∗
L, and
the payoff of SPL in the benchmark case for three scenarios
(i) tF = 0.5 and tL = 0.5, (ii) tF = 1 and tL = 0, and
(iii) tF = 0 and tL = 1. Results reveal that although for some
parameters, the price that SPF quotes for EUs and the number
of EUs that she can attract is higher than the price of SPL and
the number of EUs of this SP, SPL can still fetch a higher
payoff than SPF . The reason is the fee that SPF pays to SPL.
In addition, we can only expect an investment by SPL if
this investment yields a higher payoff than the benchmark case
with no investment. Results in Figure 3 yield that the higher
the transport cost of SPL in comparison to SPF , the lower
would be the payoff of SPL in the benchmark case, and the
higher would be the incentive of this SP to invest and lease
her resources to SPF . Thus, the preferences of EUs for SPs,
i.e. the transport costs, are one of the main factors in gauging
the plausibility of a cooperation between an MNO and an
MVNO. If an MNO knows that EUs are reluctant joining her,
i.e. EUs have a high transport costs for the MNO, then she may
invest in her infrastructure, lease a portion of the new resources
to an independent MVNO, which EUs have lower reluctance
for, and collect the profit through the fees she charges to the
MVNO.
In Figure 3, note that if s is small, then SPF fetches a
higher payoff than SPL since she can get a higher revenue
from EUs (Figure 2-left and recalling that n∗F has the same
pattern as p∗F ). Overall, increasing s increases the payoff of
SPL. Counter intuitively, when s is large enough such that
Outcome B occurs (Corollary 2) SPF receives a higher payoff
in comparison to her payoffs when s is small. This occurs
since in this case, SPF reserves all the available resources
from SPL. This enables SPF to charge a high price for EUs
while still attracting EUs. Thus, when s is large enough, both
SPs receive high revenue at the expense of EUs paying more.
Thus, the welfare of EUs would be low. This highlights the
importance of a framework by which the per resource fee is
determined such that all entities of the market can benefit. This
framework could be a bargaining game between SPs with some
restrictions imposed by a regulator. This is a topic of future
work.
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